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CRY, NO RECOVERY!: NARROWING JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF CERCLA’S DOUBLE RECOVERY
PROVISION
ABSTRACT
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) was enacted to ensure the cleanup of thousands of hazardous
waste sites throughout the United States. The Act also purports to provide
parties who must assume the astronomical costs of cleanup with a federal right
to contribution or recovery from responsible parties. The language of the Act
clearly prohibits plaintiffs from recovering the same costs under both CERCLA
and another comparable state or federal law. However, the judiciary has
expanded the Act’s double recovery provision to prevent plaintiffs from
recovering from both responsible parties and collateral sources such as
settlements, insurance assets, and other economic benefits. Judicial gloss on
Congress’s double recovery provision prevents plaintiffs from asserting their
right to recovery, thus discouraging parties from voluntarily undertaking
cleanup and encouraging protracted litigation.
This Comment argues that CERCLA’s double recovery provision should be
narrowly interpreted to create economic incentives for parties to shoulder the
burdens of hazardous site cleanup. Plaintiffs should be allowed to recover
from collateral sources as well as other responsible parties. Because every
federal court has prohibited collateral source recovery, this Comment also
proposes that courts should not place undue weight on the plaintiff’s economic
benefit from site remediation in double recovery cases. This factor merely
represents a thin guise for further expanding the double recovery prohibition
and works to prevent plaintiffs from recovering their full remediation costs.
This Comment will demonstrate that a narrow interpretation of CERCLA’s
double recovery prohibition will ultimately further the Act’s goals of
expeditious cleanup and environmental protection.
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INTRODUCTION
Picture a typical, working-class neighborhood in the United States. Modest
row houses stand side by side. Children walk home from a brick school
building “with burns on their hands and faces.”1 A girl has a cleft palate and an
extra row of teeth in her mouth.2 The boy beside her has an eye defect.3 The
trees in the small, fenced yards are black and bare.4 It rained recently, and
noxious puddles fill the streets.5 The air is choking; a stench hangs in the
breeze.6 Huge corroding metal barrels and bits of trash seem to rise from the
ground, breaking up the earth in the brown yards.7 This place is poisonous.8
This place is also real.9 Love Canal, a neighborhood in Niagara Falls, New
York, was built above 21,000 tons of buried toxic waste.10 The area became a
dumping ground in the 1920s after William T. Love abandoned his attempt to
create a model city powered by Niagara Falls, leaving a partially dug canal
intended to connect the upper and lower Niagara Rivers.11 “[I]n the 1940s,
Hooker Chemical Company began dumping industrial waste” into the canal.12
In 1953, Hooker Chemical covered the waste site with dirt and sold it to the
city of Niagara Falls for one dollar.13 Approximately one hundred homes and a
school were built on the site in the late 1950s.14 Two years later, a
twenty-five-foot area collapsed, exposing toxic waste drums throughout the
canal area and puddles of chemicals in yards, basements, and on the school
grounds.15 Residents, who were ultimately evacuated from the site,16 reported

1

Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, EPA J., Jan. 1979, at 17, 17.
Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. High concentrations of benzene, a human carcinogen, were detected in the ground of the Love
Canal development. Id.
9 Id.
10 Laura Moss, America’s 10 Worst Man-Made Environmental Disasters, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK
(June 14, 2010), http://www.mnn.com/earth-matters/wilderness-resources/photos/americas-10-worst-manmade-environmental-disasters/love.
11 Beck, supra note 1, at 17.
12 Moss, supra note 10.
13 Beck, supra note 1, at 17. Professor Beck quipped that even at that bargain price, “[i]t was a bad buy.”
Id.
14 Id.
15 Moss, supra note 10.
16 Beck, supra note 1, at 17.
2

MURPHY GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

4/18/2016 2:28 PM

NARROWING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

1219

blue goo bubbling up from their basements, strange odors, and exploding
rocks.17
The nearly eighty different toxins that had seeped from the canal18 caused a
plethora of health problems for Love Canal residents; many suffered from
urinary tract disorders, nervous breakdowns, epilepsy, and miscarriages.19
Fifty-six percent of children born between 1974 and 1978 in the Love Canal
area suffered from birth defects.20 These health problems brought the area into
national headlines in 1978, and Love Canal became the first man-made federal
disaster area.21
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or the Act) in 1980 as a response
to the Love Canal disaster.22 At the time, the number of abandoned hazardous
waste sites in the United States was estimated at approximately 20,000, and
CERCLA provided the means for a comprehensive cleanup scheme.23 The Act
was hurriedly passed and has led to complex and protracted litigation.24
One of the most controversial issues in recent CERCLA litigation,
however, has been the Act’s double recovery provision.25 CERCLA
17

Moss, supra note 10.
Id.
19 CTR. FOR HEALTH, ENV’T & JUSTICE, LOVE CANAL 7, http://chej.org/wp-content/uploads/Documents/
love_canal_factpack.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). Over thirty years later, many of the children of Love
Canal suffer from cancer and reproductive problems. Susan Donaldson James, Love Canal’s Lethal Legacy
Persists, ABC NEWS (Aug. 11, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=5553393&page=1. Proving
causation can be difficult because most diseases that can be linked to toxic substance exposure can be caused
by multiple factors. NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC
INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 150 (2001), http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/
EE-0216B-13.pdf/$file/EE-0216B-13.pdf; see also Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 431, 432 (D. Mass.
1983), aff’d sub nom, Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1990). In Anderson, the
plaintiffs did not have conclusive evidence that their leukemia was caused by contaminated groundwater, but
they could assert a good faith basis sufficient to state a claim. Id.
20 Moss, supra note 10.
21 Id. The effects of Love Canal can still be felt; six families who purchased homes there because they
were assured the area was safe have sued, alleging that the properties were not properly remediated, and that
toxic chemicals continue to leach onto the residents’ land. ‘Love Canal’ Still Oozing Poison 35 Years Later,
N.Y. POST (Nov. 2, 2013, 11:03 PM), http://nypost.com/2013/11/02/love-canal-still-oozing-poison-35-yearslater/.
22 VALERIE M. FOGLEMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, LIABILITY, AND LITIGATION: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO SUPERFUND LAW 7 (1992).
23 3 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.02(1)(a) (2014), LexisNexis.
24 Id.
25 See generally Peter E. Seley & Stacie B. Fletcher, Profit or Profiteering: The Growing Fight over
‘Double Recovery’ in CERCLA, 24 TOXICS L. REP. (BNA) 1282, 1282–83 (2009) (noting that the double
18
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theoretically provides strictly liable responsible parties who undertake site
cleanup, such as past and present owners and operators as well as hazardous
waste transporters, with a federal claim for cost recovery or contribution
against other parties who are also responsible for the contamination.26 For
example, an owner of a current hazardous site may undertake cleanup
voluntarily or by a consent order.27 Such an owner may then sue for
contribution under CERCLA to recover some of the costs of cleanup from
other responsible parties, including past owners of the site who also
contributed to the contamination.28
The Act prohibits plaintiffs from recovering under any other comparable
state or federal law, thus preventing them from receiving a windfall double
recovery.29 The judiciary, however, has expanded the double recovery
provision to prevent plaintiffs seeking contribution from also recovering from
collateral sources such as settlements with other responsible parties and
insurance payouts.30 For example, if a potentially responsible plaintiff who has
undertaken cleanup seeks contribution from another responsible party, and has
already recovered some costs from insurance, the defendant’s share of liability
will be offset by the plaintiff’s insurance recovery.31 Defendants in these
contribution cases have jumped at the chance to assert a double recovery
defense to reduce or extinguish their own responsibility to pay for site
cleanups.32 Even when the double recovery defense is rejected, courts have
allowed defendants to escape liability by examining any economic benefit the
plaintiff may have incurred from undertaking cleanup.33
Judicial expansion of CERCLA’s double recovery provision prevents
responsible parties from voluntarily assuming the costs of hazardous waste site
recovery cases can “each be dismissed with the maxim ‘bad facts make bad law’” but that “together they
advance the dubious proposition that any cost recovery that can even remotely be associated with remediation
can offset a plaintiff’s damages”).
26 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2012).
27 Martha L. Judy & Katherine N. Probst, Superfund at 30, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 195 & n.23 (2009).
28 3 GRAD, supra note 23, § 4A.02(1)(f)(i).
29 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
30 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1282–83.
31 Basic Mgmt. Inc. v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1119–20 (D. Nev. 2008).
32 Id. Most equitable defenses such as unclean hands, laches, no proximate cause, preemption by another
federal statute, and negligence-based defenses in contribution actions have failed, making a new double
recovery defense particularly attractive to defendants. See FOGLEMAN, supra note 22, at 238–44 (discussing
CERCLA defenses).
33 See Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1285–86; see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States,
35 F. Supp. 3d 92, 155–56, 162 (D.D.C. 2014) (mem.) (holding that contract pricing offset did not constitute
double recovery, but the economic benefit to the plaintiff extinguished the defendant’s share of liability).
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cleanup.34 Federal courts should allow plaintiffs to recover from responsible
parties as well as collateral sources like settlements and insurance assets. The
judiciary should also place less weight on the economic benefit to the plaintiff
in double recovery cases. This approach would ultimately encourage
responsible parties to shoulder the initial burden of cleanup because there
would be market-based incentives to acquire future profit from both collateral
sources and contribution.35 The possibility of some future windfall would
stimulate responsible parties to claim ownership of contaminated sites,
expedite remediation, and alleviate the burden on the taxpayer.36
This Comment, proceeding in four Parts, will demonstrate the efficacy of a
narrow judicial interpretation of CERCLA’s double recovery provision.
Although this Comment does not suggest that courts should allow profiteering
by those responsible for site contamination, there must be some incentive for
affected parties to take on the initial costs of cleanup and assume their
environmental responsibilities. Collateral source recovery and less judicial
consideration of a plaintiff’s economic benefit will provide the incentives for
responsible parties to remediate the thousands of sites that pose a risk to human
health and the environment.37 Because the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) estimates that one in four Americans lives within three miles of a
contaminated site, incentives for cleanup will prove especially pertinent in the
coming years.38
First, Part I discusses CERCLA’s imperfect framework. Section A explains
the Act’s principled purpose but fragile passage, which resulted in a
compromised draft. Section B details CERCLA’s objectives and how parties
who have incurred hazardous waste site remediation costs may recover those
expenses. Section C illuminates how courts have apportioned liability among
responsible parties using a mishmash of equitable factors.
Second, Part II examines the judicial expansion of CERCLA’s double
recovery provision. Section A discusses the judiciary’s refusal to apply the
34

Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1283, 1286.
See id.
36 Id.
37 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-380, SUPERFUND: EPA’S ESTIMATED COSTS TO
REMEDIATE EXISTING SITES EXCEED CURRENT FUNDING LEVELS, AND MORE SITES ARE EXPECTED TO BE
ADDED TO THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST 1 (2010). Since 1980, the EPA has identified over 47,000 sites that
require potential cleanup. Id.
38 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-252, SUPERFUND: EPA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO IMPROVE
ITS MANAGEMENT OF ALTERNATIVES TO PLACING SITES ON THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST 1 (2013).
35
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traditional tort doctrine, the collateral source rule, to CERCLA cases. Section
B analyzes recent cases that have contributed to double recovery expansion.
This section details how recovery from insurance assets and increased property
value can prevent a plaintiff from recovering full cleanup costs from
defendants in a contribution action. This section also discusses how double
recovery has not been expanded to encompass rate recovery.
Third, Part III illustrates the most recent double recovery defense of
contract pricing offset in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States. In this case,
the court declined to find a double recovery, but placed undue weight on the
economic benefit to the plaintiff, using this factor as a guise to further expand
the double recovery prohibition.39 Section A describes how the court used
traditional allocation factors to determine liability. Section B examines the
court’s finding that contract pricing offset does not constitute a double
recovery. Section C analyzes the economic benefit to Lockheed and how the
court used this factor to reduce the government’s share of liability.
Finally, Part IV demonstrates the merits of narrowing the judicial
interpretation of CERCLA’s double recovery provision. Section A suggests the
benefits of allowing plaintiffs to recover from collateral sources as well as
other responsible parties in contribution actions. Section B describes why less
weight should be placed on the economic benefit factor to create more
incentives for responsible parties to undertake the costs of cleanup.
I. HISTORY AND APPLICABILITY OF CERCLA
Although CERCLA was enacted with noble intentions,40 the Act’s methods
of allocating liability have created confusion for the courts.41 This Part
addresses the history and applicability of CERCLA with a primary focus on its
recovery provisions and liability allocation. Section A provides a brief
legislative and judicial history of the Act in an effort to describe its drafting
imperfections. Section B focuses on CERCLA’s principal objectives and its
39 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 3d 92, 156–57 (D.D.C. 2014) (mem.)
(examining the plaintiff’s economic benefit to extinguish the defendant’s equitable share).
40 See Patrick E. Tolan Jr., Environmental Liability Under Public Law 85-804: Keeping the Ordinary out
of Extraordinary Contractual Relief, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 215, 230 (2003) (noting CERCLA’s objectives of
expeditious cleanup and polluter pays).
41 Id.; Kenneth Kilbert, Goodbye to Joint and Several Liability in CERCLA Actions, AM. B. ASS’N (Sept.
10, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/environmental/email/summer2012/summer20120912-good-bye-joint-several-liability-private-cercla-actions.html (noting that district courts disagreed about
whether PRPs could recover under § 113 for nearly twenty years).
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recovery provisions. Section C details how courts have determined the relevant
equitable factors to apportion liability when allocating hazardous waste
cleanup costs. CERCLA’s liability scheme allows plaintiffs to recover from
other responsible parties but gives courts broad discretion to diminish or even
extinguish that recovery.42
A. A Brief Legislative and Judicial History
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to address the growing number of
abandoned hazardous waste sites throughout the country.43 These sites posed
serious health and environmental risks since many of the 20,000 estimated
areas involved contaminated groundwater.44 CERCLA, also known as the
“Superfund Law,” offered ways and means to begin a much-needed cleanup of
leaky landfills and toxic dumping sites.45 The Act, which authorized the
cleanup of pollutants, contaminates, and hazardous substances, boasted an
initial $1.6 billion fund with an additional $17 billion provided in 1987, which
certainly justified the impressive title “Superfund.”46
Critics of the Superfund, however, label the Act a misnomer.47 Litigation
surrounding CERCLA has been anything but “super” because of the
complexity and ambiguity of the legislation.48 Its passage rested on fragile
support, which resulted in a hurried and imperfect draft.49 Although CERCLA
was enacted almost thirty-five years ago, courts have taken a considerable
amount of time to develop a basic understanding of the statute.50 “Continuing

42 See N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 417, 529 (N.D.N.Y. 2011),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 766 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 162.
43 3 GRAD, supra note 23, § 4A.02(1)(a).
44 Id.
45 Tolan, supra note 40, at 230.
46 3 GRAD, supra note 23, § 4A.02(1)(a).
47 See Timothy B. Wheeler, Toxic Waste Cleanup Sluggish: Critics See Overhaul of ‘Superfund’ Law as
Expensive, Inefficient, BALT. SUN (May 19, 1996), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1996-05-19/news/
1996140003_1_uperfund-law-toxic-waste-federal-superfund-program (describing the law as “completely
broken”); see also Jane Shaw & Richard Stroup, Superfund: The Shortcut that Failed, PROP. & ENV’T RES.
CTR. (May 1996), http://perc.org/articles/superfund-1 (quoting President Clinton, who said that “Superfund has
been a disaster”).
48 3 GRAD, supra note 23, § 4A.02(1)(a).
49 Id. “CERCLA . . . was hastily enacted on the eve of the lame-duck session of the 96th Congressional
term.” W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2009).
50 John R. Jacus & Dean C. Miller, Coming Full CERCLA: An Update on Superfund Developments,
ENVTL. LIABILITY (June 1999), http://www.dgslaw.com/images/materials/291564.pdf.
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controversy over CERCLA’s ‘draconian liability scheme’” and complex
judicial proceedings have led to costly litigation and confused courts.51
B. Principal Objectives and Recovery Provisions
CERCLA’s “inartful drafting” is most evident in the ambiguous language
of the Act, and with little legislative history to aid courts in gleaning
Congressional intent, the judiciary has been “mystified” by “many of the
controlling provisions.”52 CERCLA is a remedial statute; it digs into the past to
determine who is responsible for hazardous waste at contaminated sites.53
Courts have construed the Act liberally in order to give effect to its principal
objectives: the primary purpose is expeditious cleanup, and the secondary
objective is making responsible parties pay the cost.54 This logic is sound, and
the concept is simple, but CERCLA’s application has been confounding.55 One
of the primary points of confusion has been recovery under the Act.56
CERCLA imposes strict liability on potentially responsible parties (PRPs);57
PRPs may include hazardous waste arrangers or transporters,58 present site
owners, or owners and operators at the time of the hazardous disposal.59 Those
who have incurred hazardous waste site cleanup expenses, also known as

51

Id.
N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 417, 486 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d
in part, vacated in part, 766 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 2014).
53 Id. at 486–87 (quoting Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 130 (2d
Cir. 2010)).
54 Tolan, supra note 40, at 230; see also N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d at 486; Fogleman,
supra note 22, at 1. CERCLA assures “that those responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or injury
from chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions.” Adobe Lumber, Inc. v. Hellman, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1188,
1198 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 13 (1980)).
55 Tolan, supra note 40, at 230. In the first twenty years, there was considerable litigation over whether
potentially responsible parties (PRPs) could bring recovery actions under § 107, which provides for joint and
several liability, or § 113, which only saddles defendants with their equitable share of cleanup costs. Kilbert,
supra note 41. District courts were split in their interpretation of the two provisions until the appellate courts
unanimously determined that PRPs could only sue under § 113. Id. The controversy continued, however, when
the Supreme Court allowed a PRP who had incurred cleanup costs to sue under § 107. See United States v. Atl.
Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 134 (2007).
56 See N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d at 487 (describing the courts’ reconciliation of
recovery provisions as a “tortured path”).
57 Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 229, 240 (D. Conn. 2012). “[T]he
traditional tort concept of causation plays little or no role in the liability scheme.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir. 1993)).
58 Tolan, supra note 40, at 231.
59 N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
52
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response costs,60 can recover under §§ 107(a) or 113(f).61 Section 107(a)
allows those who have incurred necessary costs to seek reimbursement from a
PRP, while § 113(f)(1) allows a PRP to recover contribution from a defendant
PRP.62 Thus, a party sued for cost recovery under § 107(a) may counterclaim
for contribution from another PRP under § 113(f)(1).63 The crucial difference
between the two recovery provisions rests in the allocation of liability:
§ 107(a) provides for joint and several liability among PRPs while § 113(f)
allows a presiding court to “allocate response costs among liable parties using
such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.”64 A defendant
in a § 113 claim is not subject to joint and several liability, and is only liable
for an equitable share of the cleanup costs determined by the presiding court.65
For example, a potentially responsible owner of a contaminated site who
remediates that site may then sue for contribution from a former site owner
under § 113(f).66 The presiding court would then determine the concerned
parties’ equitable share of costs for the cleanup.67
C. Response Cost Allocation: Equitable Factors and Liability Apportionment
Section 113(f) provides no insightful details as to which equitable factors
should be considered or how liability should be apportioned.68 Because liability
is not joint and several under § 113(f)—but merely several—plaintiffs bear the
burden to prove each defendant PRP’s liability and equitable share of the

60 Id. at 519–20. “[T]he term ‘response costs’ is subject to liberal construction” and usually covers any
actions taken to clean up, monitor, assess, remedy or prevent the release of hazardous substances. Id.
61 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96510, § 107(a), 94 Stat. 2781 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012)); Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 113(f), 100 Stat. 1647–48 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f)(1) (2012)).
62 N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d at 489.
63 Id. at 487. CERCLA recovery actions may be analyzed under traditional game theory principles.
Under such an analysis, plaintiff PRPs seeking contribution from defendant PRPs must act in such a way as to
maximize their wins. See Mary A. Taft, Modeling Superfund: A Hazardous Waste Bargaining Model with
Rational Threats 16–36, 50–56 (Sept. 2000) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst), microformed on UMI Microform 9988845 (Bell & Howell Info. & Learning Co.) (presenting a
settlement and negotiations model for the EPA and responsible parties based on game theory principles).
64 N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d at 489.
65 Kilbert, supra note 41.
66 See N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d at 489.
67 Id.
68 Steven Ferrey, Inverting the Law: Superfund Hazardous Substance Liability and Supreme Court
Reversal of All Federal Circuits, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 640 (2009). “Once liability
has been established, the question is how to allocate that liability.” Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc.,
852 F. Supp. 2d 229, 241 (D. Conn. 2012).
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cleanup costs.69 Such a plaintiff cannot shift his own liability; he retains the
costs of his equitable share of the cleanup, plus the share of any defendant PRP
against whom the plaintiff cannot sustain his burden.70 This liability scheme
has resulted in drastically different outcomes for PRPs caught in CERCLA
litigation.71
Another cause of disparate litigation outcomes is the range of equitable
factors courts use to apportion liability.72 The expansive language of CERCLA
§ 113(f)(1) has afforded the judiciary broad discretion.73 Federal courts often
use three sets of factors to allocate liability in CERCLA cases: the Gore
factors, the Torres factors, and a nebulous grouping of “other” equitable
factors.74 A presiding court may choose to consider several of these factors, a
few factors, or just one determining factor, depending on the circumstances of
the case.75
The Gore Factors, named after then-Representative Al Gore’s unsuccessful
amendment to CERCLA, focus on the amount and toxicity of the hazardous

69

Ferrey, supra note 68, at 641.
Id.
71 Id. PRPs are often unable to predict outcomes of litigation due to a court’s broad discretion in applying
equitable allocation factors. See Daniel Riesel & Ashley S. Miller, Cleanup & Liability: Fundamental Issues in
Private Party Hazardous Materials Litigation, SR045 ALI-ABA 841, 855 (2010). For example, courts may
focus on highly technical Gore factors like waste volume, toxicity and hazardous mobility. Id. at 911–12.
However, a court’s addition of a non-technical factor, such as cooperation with the government, would
significantly increase a site owner’s response costs. See United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497,
1504 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that the site owner’s lack of cooperation with the EPA increased his share of
response costs). By contrast, the court in Allied Signal, Inc. v. Amcast International Corp. ignored the Gore
factor of cooperation with the government in determining allocation costs even though the site owner had been
deficient in its waste analysis. 177 F. Supp. 2d 713, 754 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
72 Fogleman, supra note 22, at 153 (noting that courts may consider “any factor they deem to be in the
interest of justice”); see also N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d at 529 (explaining that the
expansive powers vested in the courts to allocate costs have resulted in differing approaches to the equitable
distribution of remedial costs), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 766 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 2014). The majority of
federal courts agree that parties have no right to a jury trial in a § 113(f) contribution action because allocation
is equitable in nature. E.g., CPI Plastics, Inc. v. USX Corp., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1376–77 (N.D. Ga. 1995);
see also Consol. City of Indianapolis v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 1:02-CV-1340, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18180, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 2003).
73 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2012). A reviewing court may “allocate response costs among liable
parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.” Id.; see Lockheed Martin Corp. v.
United States, 35 F. Supp. 3d 92, 122 (D.D.C. 2014) (mem.) (noting that courts have universally held that
CERCLA grants courts a significant amount of discretion in allocating liability); N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp.,
808 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
74 Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 123 (“Given the broad discretion granted in CERCLA § 113(f)(1), courts
also look beyond the Gore and Torres factors when equitably allocating response costs.”).
75 Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 229, 247 (D. Conn. 2012).
70
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waste and the degree of involvement and care of the parties.76 The Torres
Factors include a party’s responsibility and culpability, the degree to which a
party benefited from the hazardous waste disposal, and the parties’ abilities to
pay.77 Other factors may include the acquiescence of the parties in the
contamination,78 the value of the contamination-causing activities to the
government’s national security efforts,79 the existence of an indemnification
agreement,80 the financial benefit a party may gain from site remediation,81 the
potential that a plaintiff might make a profit on the contamination,82 and the
principle that PRPs, not taxpayers, should bear the cleanup costs.83
The discretionary approach to cost allocation among PRPs forestalls
predictable outcomes for litigants and provides district courts with the means
to disallow full recovery.84 Because a PRP who has incurred response costs
may not be able to fully recover those costs in a contribution action, there is
little incentive to undertake cleanup and risk financial loss.85 Creating
economic, market-based incentives for contribution plaintiffs, like the
incentives in the “cap and trade” approach,86 will motivate corporate PRPs to
assume cleanup while still advancing the policies of environmentalism
underlying CERCLA.87

76

Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 123.
Id.
78 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1420, 1426 (D. Md. 1991).
79 Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 299 F.3d 1019, 1029 (9th Cir. 2002).
80 See Halliburton Energy Servs. Inc. v. NL Indus., 648 F. Supp. 2d 840, 877, 884 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
81 Litgo N.J., Inc. v. Martin, No. 06-2891, 2011 WL 65933, at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2011), aff’d in part,
vacated in part sub nom. Litgo N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 725 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2013).
82 Vine St., LLC v. Keeling ex rel. Estate of Keeling, 460 F. Supp. 2d 728, 765 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
83 Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 229, 256 (D. Conn. 2012).
84 Riesel & Miller, supra note 71, at 855.
85 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1286.
86 The cap sets a minimum level of allowable pollution and punishes corporations that exceed that level.
Companies may trade, buy, or sell allowances on the market. The same pollution cuts are achieved, and
companies who make more cuts can make a profit by selling their unused allowances. How Cap and Trade
Works, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, http://www.edf.org/climate/how-cap-and-trade-works (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
87 “If we can make conservation profitable, people will find ways to make it happen.” Economics:
Making it Profitable to Protect Nature, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, http://www.edf.org/approach/markets (last visited
Mar. 4, 2016).
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II. A NEW ISSUE IN ALLOCATING RESPONSE COSTS: DOUBLE RECOVERY
One controversial and evolving factor among the “other” factors has been
the issue of double recovery.88 The Act’s double recovery provision expressly
prohibits parties from recovering costs due to claims arising from hazardous
sites under CERCLA and “recovering compensation for the same removal
costs or damages or claims pursuant to any other State or Federal law.”89 This
provision seems to disallow recovery only for the same damages under both
CERCLA and other laws, but federal courts have interpreted the Act to
prohibit all forms of double recovery.90 This broad interpretation has prevented
plaintiff PRPs from obtaining response costs through contribution from other
liable parties, which thwarts CERCLA’s purpose of promoting voluntary
corporate cleanup.91 Part II of this Comment considers how federal courts have
expanded CERCLA’s double recovery provision, which has discouraged
responsible parties from undertaking cleanup and allowed defendants to escape
liability.92 Section A discusses courts’ disinclination to apply the collateral
source rule to CERCLA recovery actions. Section B presents a case-by-case
analysis examining the judicial expansion of the double recovery defense.
A. The Collateral Source Rule and CERCLA
In accordance with the language of the double recovery provision,93
CERCLA preempts state-law remedies of indemnification and restitution in
contribution claims.94 A plaintiff cannot recover the same damages under state
law and also under CERCLA, which comports with the plain meaning of
§ 9614(b).95 However, federal courts have expanded this plain meaning by
interpreting the double recovery provision to prohibit the application of the

88

See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 3d 92, 154 (D.D.C. 2014) (mem.) (discussing
the judicial history of CERCLA double recovery).
89 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b) (2012).
90 Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 154 (discussing how courts have developed a broader equitable double
recovery theory based on the principle that a PRP cannot recover more than it paid in response costs).
91 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1284.
92 Id. at 1284–86.
93 See 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b) (disallowing recovery for the same damages under other law).
94 Price v. U.S. Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1994); Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States,
No. 05-2328-JWL, 2007 WL 4300221, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 8, 2007). CERCLA prohibits a party from
“receiving the same recovery under both CERCLA and a comparable state statute—an interpretation that is
supported by a litany of cases.” Id.; New York v. Hickey’s Carting, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 108, 112 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
95 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b).

MURPHY GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

4/18/2016 2:28 PM

NARROWING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

1229

collateral source rule in contribution actions.96 Every federal court that has
considered the question has held that the collateral source rule is inapplicable
to CERCLA contribution claims, despite the efforts of numerous PRPs in
litigation.97 By labeling collateral source payments such as insurance assets
and settlements as forms of double recovery, courts discourage plaintiff PRPs
from undertaking costly hazardous waste cleanup and encourage protracted
litigation.98 This Comment argues that federal courts should allow this
traditional tort doctrine in CERCLA contribution actions to encourage PRPs to
assume cleanup costs.
The collateral source rule is derived from the common law and rooted in
tort actions.99 The rule provides that payments made to, or benefits conferred
on, an injured party from other sources are not credited towards the tortfeasor’s
liability, even if those payments cover all of the harm for which the tortfeasor
is liable.100 Under the collateral source rule, a plaintiff may recover more than
the damages he has suffered.101 This principle of double recovery provides that
compensation or indemnity from a collateral source would not diminish the
damages recoverable from the tortfeasor.102 Courts applying the collateral
source rule refuse to reduce compensation simply because the plaintiff has
recovered from a collateral source even if it results in the plaintiff recovering
twice for a single loss.103 The rule often applies in tort cases when a plaintiff
has been compensated by unemployment compensation, social security
disability payments, or the plaintiff’s insurance.104 For example, if a plaintiff
recovered from his insurance assets, he may still recover from a defendant
tortfeasor for the same injury under the collateral source rule.105
The purpose of the collateral source rule in tort suits is to prevent a
wrongdoing defendant from receiving credit for another source’s compensation
of an injured party.106 Such a credit to the defendant would reduce the amount
payable to the plaintiff.107 Courts have reasoned that where one party would
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 229, 255 (D. Conn. 2012).
Id.
Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1283.
Friedland v. TIC-The Indus. Co., 566 F.3d 1203, 1205–06 (10th Cir. 2009).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
Id.
Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
Id.
Friedland, 566 F.3d at 1206.
See id.
Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 840 P.2d at 1074.
Id.
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receive a windfall, the benefit of a double recovery for a plaintiff is preferable
to reduced liability for a torfeasor.108 Application of the collateral source rule
reflects the public policy that wrongdoers must pay, which enforces an idea of
responsibility and prevention.109
Every federal court that has examined the issue has declined to apply the
collateral source rule to CERCLA actions.110 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that
the common law collateral source rule does not apply because the Act itself
clarifies that claims for contribution “shall be governed by federal law.”111 The
court also rejected the purpose of the collateral source rule: the idea that it is
preferable for a plaintiff to receive a windfall than for a tortfeasor to escape
liability. The Tenth Circuit concluded that there is no innocent party in a
CERCLA contribution claim; all parties are culpable tortfeasors.112 Federal
courts have determined that the public policy of bestowing a windfall upon an
innocent, injured party is simply inapplicable in CERCLA actions because
there is no injured party.113 The environment is the only injured party for
CERCLA’s purposes.114
Because the judiciary has determined that the collateral source rule does
not apply in CERCLA cases, plaintiffs can only receive reimbursement for
cleanup costs expended beyond their allocated share of responsibility.115
Federal courts have placed too much emphasis on preventing windfalls to
plaintiffs seeking contribution for cleanup.116 The judiciary’s refusal to invoke
the collateral source rule in CERCLA cases discourages voluntary cleanup and
produces protracted, costly litigation.117 This Comment proposes that courts
should allow plaintiffs to recover from collateral sources as well as from other
responsible parties as a means of providing a financial incentive to undertake
the initial and necessary costs of hazardous site cleanup.118 Assigning a
108

Id.; see also Gypsum Carrier Inc. v. Handelsman, 307 F.2d 525, 534–35 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding that
collateral source funds are for the benefit of the injured party, not for the party who injures him).
109 Green v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 59 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1995); see, e.g., Windsor Sch.
Dist. v. State, 956 A.2d 528, 542–43 (Vt. 2008).
110 Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 229, 255 (D. Conn. 2012).
111 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2012); Friedland v. TIC-The Indus. Co., 566 F.3d 1203, 1206 (10th Cir. 2009).
112 Friedland, 566 F.3d at 1206–07.
113 Id. at 1206; Yankee Gas Servs., 852 F. Supp. 2d at 255.
114 Yankee Gas Servs., 852 F. Supp. 2d at 255.
115 Basic Mgmt. Inc. v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1124 (D. Nev. 2008).
116 See generally Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25 (proposing that courts should not consider double
recovery as an equitable factor in CERCLA cases).
117 Id. at 1283.
118 Id. at 1282, 1286.
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property right to remediation and allowing a contribution plaintiff increased
recovery through collateral sources will lead to the optimal solution of
expedited cleanup.119
B. The Expansion of the Double Recovery Defense: A Case-by-Case Analysis
This section investigates the history of CERCLA double recovery cases
and the expansion of the double recovery defense. First, it discusses
settlements with other PRPs as a form of double recovery. Second, it details
the expansion of double recovery to prohibit plaintiffs from recovering cleanup
costs from their insurance assets. Third, this section addresses how courts have
considered a plaintiff’s economic benefit from increases in property value to
similarly prevent plaintiff recovery and allow defendant sidestepping. Finally,
it focuses on the federal courts’ surprising narrowing of double recovery
expansion in the rate recovery cases.
1. Settlement: A Traditional Area of CERCLA Double Recovery Dispute
The traditional areas of double recovery dispute in CERCLA actions
include collateral recovery under state or federal law120 and recovery from
settlements with other PRPs.121 The federal courts have concurred in
proscribing litigating parties from recovering cleanup costs that had been
previously recovered through settlements with other PRPs.122 CERCLA
§ 9613(f)(2) provides that a judicially approved government settlement “does
not discharge any of the other potentially liable persons unless its terms so
provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount of the
settlement.”123 This ban prevented plaintiff PRPs from recovering response
119 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (theorizing that
assigning property rights leads to an optimal solution, regardless of who receives those rights); How Cap and
Trade Works, supra note 86. For example, the cap and trade approach assigns a property right to pollution
allowances. Companies who do not use their allowances may sell them freely on the market to companies who
need additional allowances. In accordance with Professor Coase’s theory, cap and trade has achieved an
optimal solution by reducing the negative environmental impact.
120 See Price v. U.S. Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that CERCLA’s double recovery
provision prohibits collateral recovery under state or federal law).
121 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1282.
122 United States v. Davis, 31 F. Supp. 2d 45, 69 (D.R.I. 1998) (noting that settlements must be considered
under CERCLA § 113(f)(1) to prevent double recovery), aff’d, 261 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001); Boeing Co. v.
Cascade Corp., 920 F. Supp. 1121, 1140 (D. Or. 1996) (determining, without reason, that settlements must be
considered as an equitable factor in the allocation of response costs under CERCLA § 113(f)), aff’d in part,
207 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2000).
123 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2012).
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costs through settlements with other PRPs, and then recovering those same
costs from another defendant PRP in a CERCLA contribution claim.124
Section 9613(f)(2) only applies to settlements with the government; however,
the Eighth Circuit broadened this prohibition to govern all CERCLA
settlements in contribution actions.125 The court determined that § 9613(f)(2)
should be considered as an equitable factor in apportioning response costs in
accordance with CERCLA’s policy against double recovery.126 The Eighth
Circuit broadened § 9613(f)(2) to apply not only to government settlements,
but also settlements between private parties in CERCLA contribution suits, and
expanded double recovery under the Act.127 A majority of federal courts have
followed the Eighth Circuit, consistently holding that settlements with other
liable parties in fact fall under CERCLA’s double recovery prohibition.128
Several district courts, however, have adopted a flexible methodology by
applying a proportionate share approach to allocating settlements.129 This
proportionate share approach reduces a defendant PRP’s liability by the
equitable share of liability of the settling parties.130 It makes no difference that
parties may have settled for more than their equitable share.131 Therefore, a
plaintiff may reap a windfall from a settlement with a defendant for more than
a defendant’s equitable share because the liability of the remaining defendants
will only be reduced by the share amount, not the actual settlement amount.132
The proportionate share approach represents a more flexible attitude toward

124

K.C. 1986 Ltd. P’ship v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1017–18 (8th Cir. 2007).
See id. at 1017 (“By failing to consider the effect of the settlements as required by CERCLA, the
district court failed to consider a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight.”).
126 Id.
127 See id. at 1017–18 (“Although § 9613(f)(2) governs only the effect of settlements with the
government, not private parties, . . . CERCLA plainly requires that the district court take these settlements
[between private parties] into its equitable consideration in the allocation process.”).
128 Id. at 1018; e.g., Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 207 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000); Raytheon Aircraft
Co. v. United States, No. 05-2328, 2007 WL 4300221, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 8, 2007); Vine St., LLC v. Keeling,
460 F. Supp. 2d 728, 765 (E.D. Tex. 2006), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Vine St. LLC v. Borg Warner
Corp., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 581 (5th Cir. Jan. 14, 2015); United States v. Davis, 31 F. Supp. 2d 45, 64
(D.R.I. 1998), aff’d, 261 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001).
129 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1285; see also Adobe Lumber, Inc. v. Hellman, No. 05-1510,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10569, at *23 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2009) (holding that a proportionate share approach
would be more equitable than a pro tanto method); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. Bessemer & Lake Erie R.R., 936 F.
Supp. 1274, 1279 (E.D. Va. 1996) (approving a proportionate share settlement); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. King
Indus., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 215, 218 (D.R.I. 1993) (applying a proportionate share).
130 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1285.
131 Id.
132 American Cyanamid, 814 F. Supp. at 218; Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1285.
125
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plaintiff profiteering.133 Federal courts should broaden this flexible attitude to
allow plaintiffs to recover from non-government PRPs without regard to
former settlements with other responsible parties. Such an approach would
create financial incentives for parties who shoulder the burden of the initial
cleanup.
2. Judicial Expansion of Double Recovery to Encompass Insurance
The traditional areas of double recovery dispute—recovery under a
comparable state or federal law and recovery through prior settlements with
other PRPs134—have been expanded to include insurance claims.135 The
majority view is that plaintiffs may not recover from both an insurance asset
and another PRP in a contribution action.136 The first case to consider the
effect of insurance on CERCLA’s double recovery provision was Vine Street,
LLC v. Keeling.137 In Vine Street, prior site owners paid their insurance
proceeds to the plaintiff in order to finance cleanup costs while the CERCLA
action was pending.138 The district court permitted the insurance proceeds to
offset the defendant’s liability.139 The court cited CERCLA § 113(f)(2) to
assert that a non-settling PRP’s liability for response costs is reduced by the
dollar amount of previous settlements with the government,140 and thus
expanded this concept to include all settlements between all parties.141 The
court further reasoned that insurance proceeds combined with CERCLA
contributions from other liable PRPs would allow plaintiffs like Vine Street to
make a profit on the contamination, which would be impermissible under
133

Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1284–85.
See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text.
135 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1284–85.
136 Id. Courts considering insurance payments in CERCLA cases have largely ignored plaintiffs’
arguments for application of the collateral source rule. Id. at 1285; see N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v.
FirstEnergy Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 417, 526 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 766 F.3d 212 (2d
Cir. 2014); Basic Mgmt. Inc. v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1125 (D. Nev. 2008).
137 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1283. See generally Vine St., LLC v. Keeling ex rel. Estate of
Keeling, 460 F. Supp. 2d 728 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that insurance proceeds for hazardous cleanup must
be considered when allocating equitable response costs under CERCLA), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Vine St. LLC v. Borg Warner Corp., 776 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015).
138 Vine St., LLC, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 762. The former site owners’ insurance agreed to pay for past,
present, and future costs incurred for remedial investigation, cleanup costs, and response costs up to the policy
limit; the owners then reimbursed Vine Street with the insurance proceeds. Id.
139 Id. at 762–66.
140 Id. at 755–56. Because there had been no previous cases involving double recovery from insurance
proceeds, the court looked to cases addressing the issue of double recovery generally for guidance. Id. at 764–
66.
141 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1282.
134
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CERCLA.142 Although Vine Street argued that the collateral source doctrine
should apply, the court rejected application of the tort rule and found that
courts may consider any double recovery as an equitable factor.143
After Vine Street, a series of courts addressed the insurance double
recovery issue, with a host of defendant PRPs claiming that insurance proceeds
reduced or extinguished a plaintiff’s CERCLA contribution claim.144 In a
subsequent insurance case, Basic Management v. United States, the Nevada
District Court found that an insurance payment does not shift liability to the
insurance company and absolve a plaintiff’s liability.145 The plaintiffs in Basic
Management had recovered most of their response costs from insurance
payouts, but still sought recovery from the government.146 The district court
reasoned that a plaintiff must have “incurred” costs, not just liability, to receive
contribution in a CERCLA claim, and found that the specific costs were
actually incurred by the insurance company, not the plaintiff.147 The court
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that they should not be precluded from
receiving contribution because they had the foresight to purchase insurance.148
Again, the court declined to apply the collateral source rule, and, relying
largely on Vine Street, held that the plaintiffs could not recover remediation
costs paid for by their insurance policy.149
After Basic Management, the Tenth Circuit weighed in on the debate about
insurance recovery in Friedland v. TIC-The Industrial Co.150 The court
followed the lead of Vine Street and Basic Management, again refusing to
apply the collateral source rule in the context of insurance.151 The Tenth
Circuit, however, noted in dicta that in determining equitable response costs,
“[w]hat matters is that the contribution plaintiff has recovered some or all of its
142 Vine St., LLC, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 765. “This is consistent with the fact that private CERCLA claimants
cannot recover damages resulting from contamination, but can only be reimbursed for some or all of their
incurred response costs.” Id.
143 Id.
144 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1282–84; see also Friedland v. TIC-The Indus. Co., 566 F.3d 1203,
1208 n.4 (10th Cir. 2009); Basic Mgmt. Inc. v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1119–20 (D. Nev. 2008).
145 569 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
146 Id.
147 Id. The term “incurred” should “include the requirement that a Responsible Party has or will actually
incur the specific cost for which it seeks contribution. Otherwise, they are only obtaining a contribution
windfall for a cost which they will never incur or have to pay.” Id.
148 Id. at 1123–25.
149 Id. at 1125.
150 566 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir. 2009).
151 Id. at 1207–09. The facts in this case were “indistinguishable” from the facts of Basic Management. Id.
at 1207.
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response costs; the identity of the entity providing the recovery is
irrelevant.”152 Ultimately, the court expanded CERCLA’s double recovery
provision to apply to recovery outside of the scope of insurance payouts, and
the court determined that any prior recovery for cleanup costs may eliminate a
plaintiff PRP’s right to CERCLA recovery.153
Vine Street, Basic Management, and Friedland collectively represent the
expansive majority interpretation of CERCLA’s double recovery provision.154
This view lacks foundation in the statutory language and obstructs CERCLA’s
objective of expeditious cleanup.155 Preventing plaintiffs’ recovery from both
insurance payouts and other PRPs discourages responsible parties from
undertaking the outrageous cleanup costs and allows defendant PRPs to skirt
liability.156
3. Judicial Expansion of Double Recovery to Encompass Property Value
Although not specifically classified as a double recovery issue, the
financial benefit that a PRP may gain from remediation of a site may be
considered as an equitable factor in allocating response costs.157 Because
CERCLA affords courts broad discretion to allocate response costs,158 the
judiciary may reduce or increase response costs based on an analysis of
whether the parties paid a reduced price for the property and if the remediation
of the land will increase its value beyond expected appreciation.159 Thus,
courts may consider the economic benefit to the plaintiff in allocating costs.160

152

Id. at 1208 n.4.
Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1284.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 1286. In 2009, the average cost of remediating a site with unacceptable human exposure was
around three million dollars. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 37, at 17. Insurance companies
have broadened their insurance products to consider environmental risk. Michael L. Stokes, Valuing
Contaminated Property in Eminent Domain: A Critical Look at Some Recent Developments, 19 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 221, 266 (2006). For example, pollution legal liability insurance provides coverage for costs incurred due
to remediation of a contaminated site. Id.
157 Litgo N.J., Inc. v. Martin, No. 06-2891, 2011 WL 65933, at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2011).
158 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 3d 92, 122 (D.D.C. 2014) (mem.).
159 Hatco Corp v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., 836 F. Supp. 1049, 1091 (D.N.J. 1993), vacated by 59 F.3d
400 (3d Cir. 1995). Courts allocate a larger portion of response costs to parties that benefit financially from
remediation. City of Wichita v. Trs. of the Apco Oil Corp. Liquidating Trust, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1101–02
(D. Kan. 2003).
160 Litgo, 2011 WL 65933, at *9.
153

MURPHY GALLEYSPROOFS2

1236

4/18/2016 2:28 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:1217

For example, in Farmland Industries v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad, the
court considered the fact that the contaminated property had increased in value
by more than $600,000 in allocating the PRP owners 85% to 90% of the
response costs.161 Likewise, in Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Industries,
Inc., the court allocated 65% of the response costs to the plaintiff owners,
noting that they had purchased the property at a discount and stood to benefit
from the increase in value post remediation.162
These cases, albeit indirectly, further illustrate the judicial expansion of
CERCLA’s double recovery prohibition in that plaintiff PRPs are prevented
from recovering more than their response costs.163 By considering increases in
property value due to remediation as an equitable factor, courts preclude
plaintiffs from receiving full contribution for fear that plaintiffs will receive a
windfall, or double recovery.164 Just as the judiciary has barred plaintiffs from
invoking the collateral source rule in CERCLA cases involving insurance
claims, courts have also expanded double recovery to encompass financial
benefits derived from property values.165 This expansion further deters PRPs
from initiating cleanup and incentivizes defendants to avoid responsibility.
4. Courts Decline to Expand Double Recovery to Rate Recovery
Although plaintiff PRPs have unsuccessfully contended that insurance
payouts and increases in property value do not constitute a windfall to a
plaintiff, a majority of federal courts have accepted the argument that rate
recovery does not amount to a double recovery under CERCLA.166 These cases
represent a stop to the more expansive view of double recovery taken in the
161 944 F. Supp. 1492, 1500–01 (D. Colo. 1996). But see City of Wichita, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 1101–02
(declining to consider the financial benefit to the non-PRP plaintiff seeking contribution). The court in City of
Wichita did not consider the plaintiff’s sizeable financial benefit because the plaintiff was not a responsible
party and had previously suffered financial detriment due to the contamination; the court determined that the
benefit was merely a restoration of the status quo. Id. at 1102; see also Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal
Corp., 287 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1181–82 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that rent increases in a mobile home park did
not preclude the plaintiff from seeking recovery because the increases were not specifically designed to
compensate for response costs), aff’d, 433 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 2006).
162 No. 94-0752, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14446, at *213–15 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1996).
163 See id.; Farmland, 944 F. Supp. at 1500–01 (holding that the PRP site owners were responsible for
additional remediation costs because the site’s value had increased by more than $600,000 as a result of
cleanup).
164 See Farmland, 944 F. Supp. at 1500–01.
165 See id.
166 Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 229, 254–56 (D. Conn. 2012); N.Y. State
Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 417, 528–29 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, 766 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 2014).
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string of cases discussed above.167 The issue of rate recovery was first explored
in 2011 in N.Y. State Electric & Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp.168 New York
State Electric and Gas Corp. (NYSEG) sought CERCLA recovery for response
costs from defendant FirstEnergy for coal-tar contamination from 1922 to 1940
around a number of manufactured-gas plants in New York.169 FirstEnergy
argued that in allocating response costs, the court should consider the fact that
NYSEG had passed its response costs on to its ratepayers.170 FirstEnergy
contended that because NYSEG had fully recovered its response costs from
ratepayers, NYSEG should not receive the benefit of a windfall double
recovery by also recovering in a CERCLA contribution action.171 Based on
every federal court’s prior refusal to apply the collateral source rule, one might
imagine that FirstEnergy’s argument would prevail.172 The court, however,
distinguished rate recovery from insurance payouts and determined that rate
recovery, though a collateral source of reimbursement, did not pose a risk of
double recovery.173
In holding that rate recovery posed no danger of double recovery, the court
relied on its finding that money collected from NYSEG customers in the form
of increased rates actually belonged to the ratepayers.174 NYSEG had placed
increased rate payments collected to defray the expense of cleanup in a rate
deferral fund.175 The court assumed that any recovery NYSEG obtained under
CERCLA would eventually benefit NYSEG customers in the form of lower
rates.176 Considering NYSEG’s rate recovery as an equitable factor in
allocating response costs would “work an injustice to NSYEG’s customers
167 See Friedland v. TIC-The Indus. Co., 566 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that any prior
recovery may eliminate the plaintiff’s recovery in a contribution action); Basic Mgmt. Inc. v. United States,
569 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1120 (D. Nev. 2008) (concluding that plaintiff was prohibited from recovering
remediation costs paid for by the plaintiff’s insurance); Vine St., LLC v. Keeling ex rel. Estate of Keeling, 460
F. Supp. 2d 728, 765–66 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (declining to apply the collateral source rule to contribution actions
involving insurance assets); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Colo. & E. R.R., 944 F. Supp. 1492, 1500–01 (D. Colo.
1996) (increasing the plaintiff’s equitable share because of the financial benefit from remediation); Bethlehem
Iron Works, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14446, at *213–15 (considering the financial benefit to the plaintiff in
allocating response costs).
168 808 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
169 Id. at 427, 465.
170 Id. at 525.
171 Id. at 528.
172 See supra Part II.A.
173 N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d at 528–29.
174 Id. at 529.
175 Id. The court found that the rate increases represented payments “over and above payments for actual
products and services received.” Id.
176 Id.
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who would be required to bear a higher proportion of liability merely because
they were subject to the higher rates required to fund the rate deferral plan in
the past.”177 The court rejected FirstEnergy’s argument and declined to
consider NYSEG’s recovery from increased rates as an equitable allocation
factor.178
Similarly, in Yankee Gas Services Co. v. UGI Utilities Inc., defendant UGI
argued that $2,216,000 per year in rate recovery should be considered by the
presiding court to reduce UGI’s CERCLA liability costs.179 However, Yankee
Gas Services argued that the rate recovery monies should be subject to the
collateral source rule.180 Relying on the court’s determination in N.Y. State
Electric & Gas Corp. that the risk of double recovery in rate recovery cases is
dissimilar from the insurance context, the court allowed Yankee Gas to recover
from both the collateral source and UGI.181 The court reasoned that money
recovered from UGI would allow the Connecticut Department of Public Utility
Control to reduce the amount it permitted Yankee Gas to collect from utility
customers.182 Thus, the ratepayer, not Yankee Gas, would receive the
windfall.183 The court held that this resolution furthered CERCLA’s objective
that responsible parties pay; taxpayers should not be forced to shoulder the
burden of environmental cleanup costs.184
Both N.Y. State Electric & Gas Corp. and Yankee Gas illustrate the judicial
unwillingness to allow non-responsible parties to pay for hazardous waste site
cleanups under CERCLA.185 Federal courts have precluded PRPs from
recovering full response costs if a PRP has previously recovered through an
insurance payout or a post-remediation increase in property value.186 Courts
have, however, allowed PRPs to recover response costs when a PRP has
received money from rate increases specifically allocated to environmental
cleanup costs.187
177

Id.
Id.
179 852 F. Supp. 2d 229, 254 (D. Conn. 2012).
180 Id.
181 Id. at 255.
182 Id. at 256.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 See id.
186 See supra Part II.B.2–3.
187 See supra Part II.B.4. In City of Wichita v. Trustees of the Apco Oil Corp. Liquidating Trust, the
plaintiff was allowed to recover because it was a non-responsible party, which demonstrates the CERCLA
objective that responsible parties pay. 306 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1101–02 (D. Kan. 2003).
178
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The rate recovery decisions raise several questions about the courts’
reasoning and interpretation of CERCLA. First, does CERCLA’s objective to
relieve taxpayers of responsibility for cleanup costs override CERCLA’s goals
of encouraging voluntary clean up and settlement?188 How can courts be sure
that PRPs who receive response cost contribution in rate recovery cases will
return the monies received to ratepayers in the form of reduced charges for
future services? Should the concerns courts have about the burden to taxpayers
extend to insurance companies?
Unfortunately, none of these questions have been answered by federal
courts to date, and defendants continue to assert a double recovery defense to
avoid cleanup liability costs.189 More questions have also arisen with the most
recent PRP defense of contract pricing offsets.190 The following Part turns to a
discussion of the newest issue in CERCLA double recovery cases: double
recovery in contracts.191 Part III analyzes the D.C. District Court’s expansion
of double recovery under the guise of an economic benefit analysis in
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States. Section A outlines how the court used
traditional allocation factors to determine liability. Section B analyzes the
court’s determination that contract pricing offset did not constitute a double
recovery under CERCLA. Section C focuses on how the court used the
economic benefit factor as a mere guise for double recovery, which allowed
the government to escape liability.
III. DOUBLE RECOVERY IN CONTRACTS: LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP. V.
UNITED STATES
In April 2014, the D.C. District Court decided an “issue of first impression”
for the court: whether contract pricing offsets should be considered as an
equitable factor in allocating CERCLA response costs.192 This Part examines
the Lockheed decision in depth. The contract pricing offset defense will likely

188

See Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1284.
Id. at 1285–86.
190 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 3d 92, 110 (D.D.C. 2014) (mem.); Raytheon
Aircraft Co. v. United States, No. 05-2328, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89671, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 5, 2007).
191 Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 153.
192 Id. at 110. The contract pricing offset defense was first raised in Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United
States. The United States presented an affirmative defense that sought to preclude Raytheon from recovering
as costs those amounts received through government contracts that included a percentage of site environmental
costs as an overhead charge. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89671, at *3. Raytheon Aircraft
settled before trial. Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 110 n.21.
189
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be asserted in future CERCLA double recovery cases,193 and although the
court rejected this defense, it prevented the plaintiff from recovering its full
response costs by placing undue weight on the economic benefit factor.194 This
factor merely serves as a guise for further double recovery expansion and
allows defendants to escape liability for hazardous waste site cleanup costs.
A. The Lockheed Court’s Allocation of Response Costs
Lockheed Martin brought a CERCLA recovery action against the United
States for remediation of environmental contamination caused by the operation
of three rocket motor production facilities in California from 1954 to 1975.195
Lockheed researched and developed solid propellant rocket technologies under
government contracts in support of military and scientific programs that were
critical to U.S. Cold War efforts.196 Waste from these operations was
“voluminous,”197 resulting in soil and groundwater contamination, which in
one site created a plume from down gradient traveling Trichloroethylene
approximately four miles away from the rocket production site.198 Lockheed
undertook environmental cleanup of the three sites in the early 1990s,199
incurring nearly $287 million in environmental response costs, with an
estimated $124 million in future response costs.200
Lockheed had recovered its response costs for the sites from its customers
by allocating its cleanup expenses to its contracts as indirect costs.201
Specifically, Lockheed had indirectly recovered $208 million through indirect
costs charged to its largest customer, the U.S. government.202 This cost
recovery system was formalized by an agreement called the Discontinued
193

Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 110 n.21.
See id. at 158–59.
195 Id. at 97.
196 Id. at 98.
197 Id. at 104.
198 Id. at 105–06.
199 Id. at 107–09. The California Department of Health Services issued a consent order requiring cleanup
of the contaminated sites. Id. at 108. The Lockheed court noted that Lockheed’s cooperation in cleanup efforts,
however, could “hardly be considered voluntary.” Id. at 133. Prior to accepting responsibility, Lockheed
denied liability for the contamination and “initiated cleanup efforts only after it was ordered to do so by the
Santa Ana Regional Water Quality Control Board.” Id.
200 Id. at 105.
201 Id. at 109.
202 Id. The recovery—$208 million—amounts to over 72% of Lockheed’s past response costs. Id. Most of
Lockheed’s government contracts were Department of Defense contracts. Id. Lockheed admitted that “its
‘underlying tenet in pricing [its] contracts with the US government’ [was] its ‘ability to recover [its] costs.’”
Id. at 113.
194
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Operations Settlement Agreement (DOSA) signed by the U.S. Defense
Contract Management Agency and Lockheed in 2000.203
Under the DOSA, Lockheed collected its environmental response costs in
an accounting pool: the Settled Discontinued Operation Pool (DiscOps
Pool).204 The costs for a given year were then amortized over five years and
charged as increased fees to government contracts.205 The DOSA also
provided, however, that any direct payments Lockheed received for
environmental remediation would eventually be credited back to the DiscOps
Pool, amortized, and passed on to the government in the form of reduced price
contracts.206
The parties stipulated to liability, and the court invoked the per capita
approach of a fifty–fifty split between Lockheed and the government which
would then be subsequently adjusted to reach an equitable allocation.207 The
court began the traditional allocation analysis, and applied a mishmash of Gore
factors, Torres factors, and other factors to determine equitable shares.208
Under traditional equitable allocation, the court concluded that Lockheed was
liable for 70%, 75%, and 80% of the response costs for each of the three
facilities; the government was found liable for 30%, 25%, and 20% shares.209
B. Contract Pricing Offset Poses No Danger of Double Recovery
The court then considered the “novel issue” of contract pricing double
recovery: the effect Lockheed’s indirect recovery of its response costs through
government contracts should have on equitable allocation of those same costs
between Lockheed and the government.210 Lockheed had indirectly recovered
203 Id. at 110. The cost recovery system is based on the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), which
require the government to pay contractors for their indirect costs. Id. Environmental costs are typically
allowable indirect costs that may be reimbursed to a contractor by the government. Id.
204 Id. at 112–13.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 112.
207 Id. at 132. The court noted that mathematical precision in allocating liability is neither achievable nor
desirable. Id.
208 Id. The court considered the waste attributable to each party; the parties’ benefits from waste disposal;
the degree of cooperation in cleanup; the government’s ownership of waste and facilities; knowledge of risk of
pollution; violation of California water quality laws; ability to pay; and indemnification provisions. Id. at 132–
44. The court placed special emphasis on the following facts: Lockheed exercised more control over hazardous
waste disposal; the government acquiesced in Lockheed’s disposal; and some of the disposal violated both
internal Lockheed and government rules. Id. at 144–53.
209 Id. at 153.
210 Id.
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72% of its total response costs for the sites from the government through
higher-priced contracts, a significantly larger portion than the equitable share
determined by the court (only 20% to 30%).211 In fact, the government’s actual
or “effective share” was more than two times higher than its equitable share.212
The United States argued that this amounted to a double recovery for PRP
Lockheed.213
Lockheed contended that the double recovery issue here was most
analogous to the rate recovery cases, which posed no threat of a windfall to the
plaintiff, because recovery from the government would return to the
government in the form of reduced rate contracts.214 The United States argued
that it would only receive the benefit of 87% of any CERCLA payment
credited to the DiscOps Pool due to the government share of Lockheed’s
business; “Thus any allocation payment made by the [government] would
cause [its] effective share to rise even further beyond [its] equitable share.”215
The court, however, rejected the government’s position, opining that an
increase in the government’s effective share would not be tantamount to a
double recovery.216 The court reasoned that double recovery “focuses on the
projected post-recovery economic position of the plaintiff, not the
defendant.”217 Because Lockheed must allocate all of its CERCLA recovery to
the DiscOps Pool and those credits would then be passed on to the
government, the court determined that Lockheed could not recover more in
response costs than it initially paid.218
In determining that Lockheed’s contract pricing posed no risk of
impermissible CERCLA double recovery, the court also reasoned that the
government had been “complicit in designing the very system about which it

211

Id. at 154.
Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 155. Just as the ratepayers in N.Y. State Electric & Gas Corp. and Yankee Gas would benefit
from CERCLA recovery through reduced utility rates, the government would be credited any recovered funds
in future government contracts. See supra Part II.B.4.
215 35 F. Supp. 3d at 154. Lockheed would be entitled to $18 million from the government in prejudgment
interest which could potentially have been allocated to the DiscOps Pool and thus credited in part (87%) to
government contracts. Id. at 160. However, Lockheed declined to provide any assurance that the $18 million
would be credited to the DiscOps Pool, which influenced the court’s decision to ultimately reduce the
government’s share. Id.
216 Id. at 155.
217 Id. at 156.
218 Id. at 155.
212
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so bitterly complains.”219 The United States negotiated with Lockheed in
signing the DOSA, which created the allocation and crediting scheme of the
DiscOps Pool.220 The DOSA also explicitly stated that it did not settle any
claims arising under CERCLA.221 Therefore, the government could not fairly
assert that it was “blindsided” by Lockheed’s CERCLA recovery claim, and
could not be saved from the “natural and probable consequences of its own
conduct.”222 The court held that there was no double recovery in the case; the
government’s effective share could be equitably increased for Lockheed to
recover its response costs.223
Seemingly, this holding is fair and reasonable. The facts of the case, while
complicated, strongly resemble the ratepayer cases.224 The government, like
the ratepayers, will be credited any recovered CERCLA response costs, so
there is no risk that Lockheed will receive a windfall double recovery if the
government pays its effective share.225 The court’s equitable reasoning follows
precedent226 and common sense.
C. The Economic Benefit Factor: A Guise for Double Recovery
The court, however, undermines its own principled decision, stating,
“Double recovery aside, the Court is nonetheless concerned about the
economic benefit to Lockheed and the economic detriment to the taxpayer from
any CERCLA recovery of past costs in this case.”227 The court determined that
if the government were allocated an equitable share of the response costs,
Lockheed would receive three windfalls at the taxpayer’s expense.228 First, an
award of mandatory prejudgment interest would result in an $18 million
windfall to Lockheed; Lockheed presented no evidence that the prejudgment
219

Id. at 156.
Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 See generally Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 229, 256 (D. Conn. 2012)
(holding that rate recovery was not double recovery); N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp., 808
F. Supp. 2d 417, 427 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 766 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 2014). The
Lockheed court distinguished this case from the rate recovery cases because the government acted as both the
ratepayer and the defendant PRP. Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d 92, 155.
225 See Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 155.
226 See generally Yankee Gas, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 256 (holding that rate recovery was not double
recovery); N.Y. State Electric & Gas Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
227 Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 156.
228 Id. at 159.
220
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interest award would be allocated to the DiscOps Pool and thus credited back
to the government.229 Second, because 40% to 50% of Lockheed’s government
contracts are fixed-price, any recovery credits flowing from the DiscOps Pool
would not actually accrue to the government but would amount to additional
profits for Lockheed.230 Third, taxpayers had indirectly paid more than 85% of
Lockheed’s $10 million in expert and legal fees, which “flies in the face” of
CERCLA’s prohibition against the award of attorneys’ fees in recovery
actions.231 Reasoning that it would be inequitable for Lockheed to receive
these economic benefits at the taxpayer’s expense, the court reduced the
government’s share for past response costs to 0%.232
The Lockheed court’s decision placed undue weight on Lockheed’s
economic benefit. Like the property value cases discussed above, the court
merely disguised the double recovery issue as an economic benefit allocation
factor.233 Although the court held that indirect recovery through government
contracts did not constitute a double recovery,234 considering Lockheed’s
economic benefit created a result equivalent to a finding of a double recovery
windfall. The government’s share of response costs was reduced to zero for
fear that Lockheed would receive a windfall from the taxpayer,235 just as it
would have been had the court technically determined a double recovery. This
decision serves only to perplex federal courts in future contract pricing offset
CERCLA cases. Based on the precedent of the rate recovery cases, the court

229 Id. at 159–60. “CERCLA § 107(a) mandates the award of prejudgment interest” for the purpose of
providing compensation for the lost time value of the money spent on behalf of other liable PRPs. Id. at 159;
see Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel of Kan., Inc., 100 F.3d 792, 799–801 (10th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that failure to grant prejudgment interest would be a disincentive for voluntary hazardous waste
cleanup actions).
230 Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 160. The court found that the record was insufficient to determine how
much Lockheed would actually benefit from a CERCLA recovery from the government; however, the court
noted that the evidence clearly showed that the benefits to Lockheed would be “substantial and at the expense
of the taxpayer.” Id. at 161.
231 Id.; Vine St., LLC v. Keeling ex rel. Estate of Keeling, 460 F. Supp. 2d 728, 767–68 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
Although FAR § 31.205-47 allowed Lockheed to recover its legal fees and costs through government
contracts, the court determined that this outcome would be contrary to CERCLA and taxpayer interests.
Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 161. The court noted that it was beyond the scope of the case to disallow the legal
fees that had already been paid to Lockheed, choosing instead to reduce the government’s share of response
costs. Id.
232 Id. Although the court reduced the government’s share of past response costs to zero, it only decreased
the government’s share for future environmental cleanup costs by 1%, holding that the government would be
responsible for 29%, 24%, and 19% for each of the three respective hazardous waste sites. Id. at 162.
233 See supra Part II.B.3.
234 Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 156.
235 Id. at 161.
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should have determined that there was no double recovery, and thus no
reduction of the government’s effective share.236
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED NARROW DOUBLE RECOVERY
INTERPRETATION
Federal courts have expanded the prohibition on double recovery from
traditional areas—recovery under a comparable state or federal law and
recovery through prior settlements with other PRPs—to encompass recovery
from insurance payouts and increases in property value.237 Although every
federal court that has considered this issue has declined to impose the collateral
source rule in the context of CERCLA double recovery cases involving
insurance payouts, the Act’s double recovery provision should be read more
narrowly to avoid precluding PRPs who use insurance assets to undertake
cleanup efforts from also recovering from other responsible parties.238 In light
of the overwhelming precedent declining to extend the collateral source rule to
CERCLA cases, this Comment also suggests the milder proposition that double
recovery expansion should not be hidden under the thin guise of an economic
benefit allocation factor. This Part discusses the implications of a more narrow
interpretation of CERCLA’s double recovery provision. Section A examines
how allowing collateral source recovery in CERCLA contribution actions will
encourage voluntary cleanup. Section B investigates the dangers of using the
economic benefit allocation factor as a guise for double recovery expansion.

236 Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 229, 256 (D. Conn. 2012); N.Y. State Elec.
& Gas Corp. v. First Energy Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 417, 529 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
766 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 2014). In Lockheed, the court reasoned that any CERCLA recovery would be returned to
the government in the form of reduced contract pricing. 35 F. Supp. 3d at 155. Similarly, in N.Y. State Electric
& Gas Corp., the court determined that there was no risk of double recovery because any recovered response
costs would be passed on to the customers in the form of reduced rates. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 808 F.
Supp. 2d at 529.
237 K.C. 1986 L.P. v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1017 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that prior settlements
with other PRPs constituted a double recovery windfall and precluded the plaintiff from recovering response
costs in a contribution action); Vine St., LLC v. Keeling ex rel. Estate of Keeling, 460 F. Supp. 2d 728, 765
(E.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that insurance payouts constituted a double recovery and precluded the plaintiff
from recovering from another PRP); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Colo. & E. R.R., 944 F. Supp. 1492, 1500–01 (D.
Colo. 1996) (holding that an increase in property value should inflate the allocation of the plaintiff’s response
costs).
238 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1284.
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A. Implications of Allowing Collateral Source Recovery
CERCLA’s twin objectives of expeditious cleanup and polluter payment
have begun to conflict as less cooperative PRPs take advantage of the double
recovery assets of those who undertake voluntary cleanup.239 For example, a
PRP who assumes a CERCLA cleanup through collateral sources such as
insurance payouts or settlements with other PRPs would be precluded from
also recovering from a PRP in a contribution action.240 The PRP who can wait
out the cleanup by frustrating regulators and protracting litigation will be
rewarded by being able to avoid their cleanup responsibilities at the expense of
more cooperative parties.241 In turn, PRPs who pursue cleanup must forego
collateral sources such as insurance payouts to exercise their statutory right to
CERCLA contribution from other responsible parties.242
Federal courts should interpret the Act’s double recovery provision to allow
collateral source recovery. The plain language of the statute only precludes
recovery of the same response costs under comparable state or federal law.243
The broader theory of equitable double recovery is a judicially created
principle244 that usurps the paramount goal of voluntary and efficient
cleanup.245 Double recovery has been judicially expanded to preclude plaintiff
PRPs from using money recovered from settlements and insurance payouts to
undertake the costs of hazardous waste site cleanup.246 Other PRPs may avoid
cleanup costs when the plaintiff PRP takes advantage of settlement and
insurance assets.247 This could not have been Congress’s intent.
Double recovery expansion departs from both the language of the Act and
the precedent of the proportionate share approach to allocating settlements.248
The proportionate share approach allows plaintiffs to reap a windfall by

239

Id. at 1283.
See id.
241 Id. at 1286 (comparing CERCLA cleanups to “expensive games of ‘chicken’”).
242 Id.
243 See 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b) (2012).
244 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 3d 92, 154 (D.D.C. 2014) (mem.) (stating
that courts have developed a broader equitable double recovery theory based on the principle that a PRP
cannot recover more than he paid for response costs).
245 Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 n.13 (1994) (“CERCLA is designed to
encourage private parties to assume the financial responsibility of cleanup by allowing them to seek recovery
from others.”).
246 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, 1284.
247 Id. at 1286.
248 Id. at 1284.
240
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settling with a defendant for more than the equitable share while only reducing
the other defendants’ amounts by the effective share, not the actual settlement
amount.249 The proportionate approach to CERCLA settlements represents a
more flexible approach to the double recovery ban.250 This flexible approach
should extend to allocating response costs in all CERCLA contribution actions
involving settlements with other PRPs and insurance claims.
The judiciary’s allowance of collateral settlement and insurance recovery
would provide an advantage to the first PRP to undertake site remediation,
which would promote the Act’s primary objective of encouraging voluntary
cleanup.251 The PRP who remediates could then recover response costs from
the cleanup through settlements, insurance payouts, and other PRPs in a
CERCLA contribution action. PRPs who recover from collateral settlements
and insurance assets may receive some windfall, but perhaps CERCLA’s goal
of “polluter pays” should give way to its goal of promoting cleanup.252
Few academic works specifically address the double recovery issue in
CERCLA suits.253 Professors Peter E. Seley and Stacie B. Fletcher, proponents
of applying the collateral source rule to CERCLA cases, have noted that a
narrow reading of the double recovery provision considers the Congressional
goals of encouraging voluntary cleanup and settling claims without resort to
litigation.254 The counterargument is that providing greater net awards to
plaintiff PRPs ignores the Congressional goal of making polluters pay.255 Seley
and Fletcher contend—and this Comment agrees—that § 113(f), which grants
the judiciary discretion to allocate response costs using equitable factors, is
flexible enough to allow reviewing courts the power to prevent plaintiff
profiteering.256
249 American Cyanamid Co. v. King Indus., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 215, 218 (D.R.I. 1993); Seley & Fletcher,
supra note 25, at 1285.
250 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1284–85 (describing courts that have accepted the proportionate
share approach as accepting a more narrow reading of double recovery).
251 Id. at 1286.
252 See Tolan, supra note 40, at 230 (describing CERCLA’s twin objectives of site cleanup and “polluter
pays”).
253 There has, however, been some academic interest in the issue of CERCLA’s preemption of state law
claims and double recovery. For example, Kristi Weiner argues that allowing a party to bring both state and
federal claims would promote corporations to undertake cleanup and prevent taxpayers from bearing the costs.
Kristi Weiner, Note, Does CERCLA Preempt New York State Law Claims for Cost Recovery and
Contribution?, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 811, 831 (2010).
254 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1285.
255 Id. at 1286.
256 Id.
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Over the last few decades, the EPA has used economic incentives as a
principal method of solving environmental problems.257 Market-based
incentives can operate at lower costs where traditional regulations would be
ineffective;258 here, allowing collateral source double recovery would
encourage responsible parties to clean up sites which may otherwise be
orphaned, requiring cleanup through taxpayer funds. Although economic
incentives are primarily used to prevent pollution,259 encouraging remediation
in a similar way will produce equally efficient results. By allowing collateral
source recovery, corporations who undertake expeditious remediation receive a
windfall economic incentive while responsible parties who skirt liability pay a
larger share.260 This allocation will promote the optimal policy-based goal of
environmental cleanup.261
The purpose of the collateral source rule—to compensate the injured party
even if the compensation results in double recovery—can apply to compensate
the injured party in CERCLA cases: the environment.262 Although the PRP
would receive the windfall, the environment would benefit in turn because of
the incentive for expeditious cleanup.263 Federal courts would still have the
power to use equitable allocation factors to curb PRP profiteering,264 but equity
also requires the judiciary to invoke the collateral source rule in cases where
the plaintiff has undertaken the cost of recovery.265 By allowing collateral
source recovery, less weight would be given to double recovery and more
emphasis placed on the principal objective of hazardous site cleanup.266

257

NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., supra note 19, at i.
Id. at ii.
259 Id. at iii–iv (explaining that risks cannot be traded between Superfund sites, because doing so would
require some people to live near unsafe sites while others would live near a site twice as safe as required under
federal standards). This view only considers using economic incentives for pollution prevention, not
remediation. Liability under CERCLA may also be viewed as an incentive for corporations to comply with
traditional regulations, but it is unclear whether the incentive to avoid liability properly produces an optimal
level of pollution control. Id. at 143.
260 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1286.
261 Tolan, supra note 40, at 230.
262 See Friedland v. TIC-The Indus. Co., 566 F.3d 1203, 1206 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining that plaintiff
PRPs are not injured parties in CERCLA cases).
263 Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1286.
264 Id.
265 Id. Courts should place less weight on the double recovery provision, and should consider such factors
as the rights given up by the plaintiff in settlement agreements, the benefit of voluntary cleanup and the
detriment of recalcitrance, and the cost of procuring insurance. Id.
266 Id. at 1283.
258
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B. The Dangers of the Economic Benefit Factor
Because of the overwhelming precedent declining to apply the collateral
source rule to CERCLA cases,267 despite its benefits, courts are regrettably
unlikely to adopt the proposal to invoke the collateral source rule. Although
federal courts have technically determined that increases in property value and
contract pricing offsets do not constitute a double recovery in contribution
actions,268 these factors have been given undue weight in allocating response
costs under the guise of considering the economic benefit to the plaintiff.269 As
more defendants assert a double recovery defense,270 federal courts that do not
find a double recovery will nevertheless offset the defendant’s response costs
by applying the economic benefit factor.271 Courts following Lockheed’s
precedent will reward defendants who make an unsuccessful double recovery
argument with a hard look at the plaintiff’s economic benefits.272 The plaintiff,
of course, has reaped some economic benefit; otherwise the defendant would
have no reason to assert a double recovery defense. The result is a catch-22 for
the plaintiff. If a court finds a double recovery, a plaintiff will not be able to
recover its response costs.273 If a court finds no double recovery, according to
the precedent set in Lockheed, a plaintiff’s economic benefits will be
considered, and such a plaintiff will not be able to recover response costs.274
The courts’ analyses will vary, but the result is synonymous.

267 K.C. 1986 L.P. v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1017 (8th Cir. 2007); Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI
Utils., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 229, 255 (D. Conn. 2012) (noting that every federal court has declined to apply the
collateral source rule in CERCLA cases); Vine St., LLC v. Keeling ex rel. Estate of Keeling, 460 F. Supp. 2d
728, 765 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
268 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 3d 92, 155 (D.D.C. 2014) (mem.) (holding that
contract pricing offset posed no danger of double recovery); Litgo N.J., Inc. v. Martin, No. 06-2891, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2033, at *32 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2011) (holding that the plaintiff’s share could not be reduced despite
a decrease in property value), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Litgo N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 725 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2013); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Colo. & E. R.R., 944 F. Supp. 1492,
1500–01 (D. Colo. 1996) (considering increased property value as an equitable allocation factor).
269 See Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 156 (explaining that “[d]ouble recovery aside, the Court is nonetheless
concerned about the economic benefit to Lockheed”); Farmland, 944 F. Supp. at 1501 (considering the
“benefits from cleanup” as an equitable allocation factor).
270 Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 110 n.21 (noting that because environmental contamination at defense
contracting facilities is pervasive, this issue will likely be litigated again). Counsel in Lockheed identified at
least two other cases involving Lockheed and the government that concern the same issue. Id.
271 See id. at 156.
272 See id.
273 See supra Part II.
274 See Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 156.
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Consideration of a plaintiff’s economic benefit will thus become a
mandatory factor instead of an equitable factor in double recovery cases.
Mandatory allocation factors conflict with CERCLA’s intent that courts
consider the circumstances in each case to determine an equitable division of
cleanup costs.275 If the judiciary increases cost allocation whenever a plaintiff
has reaped some financial benefit, plaintiffs will be less likely to undertake
cleanup since they may fare better as the PRP defendant in a contribution
action. The economic benefit factor may extend to encompass plaintiffs who
have made any corporate profit, which will discourage PRPs with the most
resources from assuming voluntary cleanup.
Placing less weight on the economic benefit factor would remove the moral
stigma associated with pollution276 and create a practical financial incentive for
PRPs.277 Marketing environmental values creates an economic incentive for
entrepreneurs.278 Allowing PRPs some profit as a reward for undertaking initial
cleanup costs puts a market value on remediation.279 This market value
basically places remediation on the free market; remediation could be bought
by a PRP who hopes to obtain a future economic benefit from subsequent
recovery in a contribution action.280 When federal courts examine a plaintiff
PRP’s economic benefit, the free market incentive to remediate disappears.
Many commentators have argued that PRPs should be prohibited from reaping
any windfall because polluters should pay for their actions.281 However, this

275 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2012) (allowing reviewing courts to “allocate response costs . . . using
such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate”).
276 Murry Weidenbaum, Making the Marketplace Work for the Environment, in ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: REGULATING FOR RESULTS 149, 160–61 (Kenneth Chilton & Melinda Warren eds., 1991)
(arguing that pollution should not be looked at as a “sinful act” but as a costly activity “amenable to reduction
by means of proper incentives”).
277 See Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25 (arguing that providing PRPs with a financial incentive would
promote expeditious cleanup).
278 TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 21 (1991).
279 See id. (explaining that a property rights approach to natural resources provides an incentive to
entrepreneurs).
280 See id. (explaining that a stream owner who charges fisherman gains an incentive to maintain and
improve his resource).
281 E.g., id. at 25 (arguing that making contaminated site owners liable creates an incentive to take
precautions against environmental damage); see, e.g., DAVE B. KOPEL, PRIVILEGED POLLUTERS: THE CASE
AGAINST EXEMPTING MUNICIPALITIES FROM SUPERFUND 14 (1998), http://www.davekopel.com/env/
privileged-polluters.pdf (noting a New Jersey mayor’s view that polluting corporations should pay because
their profits have been “inflated by decades of cheap and inappropriate waste disposal”); Carol M. Browner,
Opinion, Polluters Should Have to Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/
01/opinion/polluters-should-have-to-pay.html (arguing that oil and chemical companies should be taxed to pay
for Superfund cleanup).
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approach has allowed defendant PRPs to escape liability when a plaintiff has
already recovered from a collateral source or has incurred some economic
benefit.282 Not all polluters pay under the current regime.283 Some PRPs skirt
payment, while the PRP who initiates cleanup cannot fully recover the costs.284
When federal courts place more emphasis on the economic benefit to a
plaintiff than the policy-based goal of expeditious cleanup, remediation is
delayed and discouraged. One of the Superfund’s primary problems since its
enactment has been slow cleanup due to high costs and prolonged litigation.285
Designation as a Superfund site causes property values to fall, and banks often
refuse to lend money for development.286 Incentivizing a PRP to take on
cleanup will expedite remediation and discourage avoiding responsibility.
As the Superfund runs dry,287 it will also become especially important to
provide some incentive to PRPs to shoulder the astronomical cleanup costs.288
The once $5 billion fund decreased to just $137 million in 2009, and taxpayer
dollars have been funding the cleanup for sites where no one has accepted
responsibility for contamination.289 Cleanup of these “orphaned sites” has
slowed dramatically, with just nineteen sites remediated in 2009, compared to
eighty-nine sites in 1999.290 Incentivizing plaintiff PRPs to remediate would
not only promote voluntary cleanup, but would further CERCLA’s goal of
preventing the taxpayer from shouldering remediation costs.291 If a plaintiff
were allowed full response cost recovery in contribution actions, without fear
that the courts will apply the economic benefit factor, more PRPs may take
responsibility for orphaned sites now being funded by taxpayers.292 A plaintiff
282

Seley & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1283.
Id. at 1286.
284 Id.
285 Shaw & Stroup, supra note 47.
286 Id.
287 Juliet Eilperin, Obama, EPA to Push for Restoration of Superfund Tax on Oil, Chemical Companies,
WASH. POST (June 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/20/
AR2010062001789.html. The Superfund has been facing a budget crunch since Congress refused to renew
government imposed taxes on oil and chemical corporations in 1995. Id.
288 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 3d 92, 105 (D.D.C. 2014) (mem.). Lockheed
incurred $287 million in environmental response costs, with an estimated $124 million in future response
costs. Id.
289 Eilperin, supra note 287; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 37, at 3.
290 Eilperin, supra note 287.
291 See Lockheed, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 124; Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 229,
256 (D. Conn. 2012) (explaining that PRPs, not taxpayers, should bear response costs).
292 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 37, at 1, 11. The EPA has spent more than
$3 billion on seventy-five sites that have “unacceptable human exposure” since 2009. Id.
283
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PRPs ability to recover contribution will prove essential to future hazardous
site cleanup funding.
CONCLUSION
Hazardous waste sites like the Love Canal area are not uncommon.293 One
in four Americans lives within three miles of a contaminated site.294 Despite
CERCLA’s intentions, the Act’s provisions have created protracted
litigation.295 Courts have interpreted CERCLA’s double recovery provision296
to prevent plaintiffs from recovering contribution as well as settlements with
other PRPs, insurance monies, and economic benefits from remediation.297 As
CERCLA’s cleanup funds decrease, providing incentives to PRPs to
voluntarily undertake cleanup will prove especially important to lift the burden
of remediation costs off the public’s shoulders.298
PRPs should be incentivized by the potential receipt of some windfall in
the form of a double recovery. Although federal courts should use equitable
allocation factors to curb profiteering, allowing PRPs to recover from collateral
sources like settlements and insurance payouts will promote efficient cleanup
efforts. The traditional purpose of the collateral source rule—to punish the
tortfeasor defendant299—should apply to CERCLA actions to punish
uncooperative and litigious PRPs and reward plaintiffs who initiate cleanup.
Because every federal court to consider the issue has declined to apply the
collateral source rule,300 federal courts should, at the very least, refrain from
using the economic benefit factor as another means of achieving double
recovery expansion. Placing undue emphasis on the plaintiff’s economic
benefits discourages PRPs from shouldering the initial burdens of cleanup, and
rewards defendants for asserting a double recovery defense. Plaintiffs should
be rewarded for their cleanup efforts, not punished for making a profit. Judicial
expansion of double recovery only thwarts CERCLA’s primary objective of

293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300

Id. at 1. Since CERCLA’s enactment, the EPA has identified 47,000 contaminated sites. Id.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 38, at 1.
3 GRAD, supra note 23, at § 4A.02(1)(a).
See 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b) (2012).
See supra Part II.B.
See Eilperin, supra note 287.
Green v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 59 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1995).
Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 229, 255 (D. Conn. 2012).
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hazardous waste site cleanup,301 and courts must narrow their interpretation of
the Act to give way to future environmental protection.
ALLISON MURPHY∗
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Tolan, supra note 40, at 230.
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